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WHEN THE KLAN ADOPTS-A-HIGHWAY:
THE WEAKNESSES OF THE PUBLIC
FORUM DOCTRINE EXPOSED
INTRODUCTION
Generally, the United States Constitution prohibits Congress and state
legislatures from curtailing an individual’s freedom of speech.1 As
demonstrated by the 1989 Supreme Court case on flag burning, if an
individual’s conduct contains elements of communication, the Court will
label it “expressive conduct” and will grant First Amendment protection.2 In
another well-known opinion,3 however, the Court held that an individual’s
freedom of speech and expression is not absolute. Most high school civics
students are familiar with Justice Holmes’s recognition that the “protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic.”4
As a means of determining when a state or local government can limit an
individual’s exercise of free speech, the Supreme Court developed the public
forum doctrine.5 Recognizing three different forums, the traditional public
forum, the limited or designated public forum, and the nonpublic forum, the
Court has specified different rules for speech expressed within each forum.
Recognizing that certain public places have immemorially been held out
as places of public discourse, when a traditional public forum exists, the state
can only impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the
speech, and these restrictions must not substantially curtail speech more than
1. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I
(emphasis added).
2. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
3. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
4. Id. at 52.
5. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985)
(“[W]e must identify the nature of the forum, because the extent to which the Government may limit
access depends on whether the forum is public or nonpublic.”).
Prior to the adoption of the public forum doctrine in Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), the Court applied an “incompatibility” test to determine
whether a state or local government had the authority to regulate an individual’s exercise of free
speech on government property. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (holding school authorities could not forbid students from wearing black
armbands in protest of war because the expressive conduct was not incompatible with maintaining
“appropriate discipline in the operation of the school” (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749
(1966))).
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necessary.6 Similar rules apply to a limited or designated public forum during
its use as a public forum.7 Conversely, in a nonpublic forum the state can
impose any reasonable limits on the public’s access to the forum because of
its interest in its governmental duties.8
While the Court has explicitly described the limits a government may
place on speech in each type of forum,9 the Court has offered lower courts
virtually no guidance in determining what analysis applies to any given
location. The courts do not know whether to define the location scrutinized
broadly or narrowly. Therefore, they do so indiscriminately, based, at least in
part, on the decision they wish to reach.
The public forum doctrine has proved unworkable in practice. This
difficulty became clear in the recent Adopt-A-Highway Cases in Missouri,10
Texas,11 and Arkansas.12 In these cases, four different federal courts,13
confronted with three substantially similar programs,14 app oached the public
forum doctrine in five different ways. Therefore, the courts reached three
different decisions regarding the type of forum at issue.15 Using th se cases
as a background, this Note develops a balancing test for lower courts to apply
in determining the location for consideration in applying the public forum
doctrine. This balancing test works in the Adopt-A-Highway cases and,
generally, in other public forum cases.
Part I of this Note analyzes the Supreme Court’s treatment of the First
Amendment as it applies to the states and the public forum doctrine. Part II
discusses the history behind and litigation confronted in these cases, and the
necessity of First Amendment protection for an applicant to an Adopt-A-
6. See infra Part I.B.1.
7. See infra Part I.B.2.
8. See infra Part I.B.3.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See Cuffley v. Mickes, No. 4:97CV2110-SNL, 1999 WL 216439 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 13, 1999);
Missouri ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n v. Cuffley, 927 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Mo.
1996), rev’d on other grounds, 112 F.3d 1332 (8th Cir. 1997).
11. See Texas v. KKK, 58 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995); Texas v. KKK, 853 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.
Tex. 1994).
12. See KKK v. Arkansas State Highway & Transp. Dept., 807 F. Supp. 1427 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
13. The federal courts that addressed these cases were the Eastern District of Missouri (twice),
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Eastern District of Texas, and the Western District of Arkansas.
14. The five published opinions on which this Note will focus began with Ku Klux Klan
applications to state Departments of Transportation for adoption of a portion of a state highway under
an Adopt-A-Highway program.
15. Addressing the case the first time, the district court in Missouri determined that the forum
was a limited public forum. See Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1257. The district court in KKK v. Arkansas
determined that the forum was a traditional public forum. See KKK v. Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. at 1434-
35. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that it was a nonpublic forum. See Texas v. KKK,
58 F.3d at 1078.
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Highway Program. Part III of this Note discusses Adopt-A-Highway
Programs in the context of the public forum doctrine. Finally, Part IV
proposes a balancing test for determining the proper scope of the location of
the forum so that courts can more effectively employ the public forum
doctrine.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. General
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the
right of freedom of speech to individuals and groups.16 Indeed, this is one of
the most important liberties enjoyed by Americans. Justice Cardozo
characterized an individual’s interest in free speech as “the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”17
The direct language of this amendment applies only to Congress, and
therefore, to the Federal Government alone. The Supreme Court, however,
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause18 and the doctrine
of selective incorporation,19 has explicitly made the First Amendment
16. Professors John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda argue that the Constitution’s Framers did
not view the protection of free speech as a necessary provision in the original Constitution because of
the limited nature of the Federal Government that they had created. According to Nowak and Rotunda,
“the government they envisioned, limited to the enumerated powers, could not constitutionally enact a
law restricting free speech because that was not among the government’s enumerated powers.” JOHN
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 989 (5th ed. 1995). Due to popular
pressure, the protection was added in the form of an amendment in 1791. See id.
17. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (while Palko’s famous holding was
overruled in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), this statement was unrelated to the holding in
Benton). In support of a broad interpretation of this fundamental liberty, Justice Holmes recognized
that it is “not free thought for those who agree with us, but freedom for the thought that we hate” that
gives the liberty its most enduring value. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
Also, both philosophers and political theorists have argued that government should allow all
speech, both true and false, both popular and unpopular. As early as 1644, in Areopagitica, John
Milton argued: “[T]hough all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so truth be in
the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and
falsehood grapple; whoever knew truth put to the worse in free and open encounter?” NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 16, at 991 (quoting JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN
MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644)); see
also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Henry Regnery Co. 1955) (1859).
18. “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3 (emphasis added). “The Fourteenth Amendment has
rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.” Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
19. Prior to the enactment of the Civil War Amendments, the Supreme Court held that the
liberties protected in the Bill of Rights against Congressional action did not apply to the activities of
state and local governments. The Court explained in 1833:
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applicable, in all aspects, to the states.20
The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves,
for their own government, and not for the government of the individual states. Each state
established a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution, provided such limitations and
restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated.
Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (emphasis added).
Soon after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, individuals began to argue that
the due process clause contained in that Amendment made the guarantees in the Bill of Rights
applicable to the states. See, e.g., Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). In 1925, in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court invalidated a state law prohibiting private
religious schools under a general understanding of due process, not because the First Amendment
prohibited government from prohibiting the exercise of religion. See id. at 534-36.
In defining the concept of liberty protected by the due process clause, the Court sometimes
incorporates the rights and liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. But the Court has never explicitly
stated that the Fourteenth Amendment makes all Bill of Rights guarantees applicable to the states; they
“incorporated” Bill of Rights guarantees through the due process clause “selectively.” See generally
GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 432-52 (13th ed. 1997). When
confronted with a specific guarantee, the Court decides whether the Fourteenth Amendment should
incorporate that specific guarantee. Through this doctrine of “selective incorporation,” the Court has
made most, but not all, of the Bill of Rights liberties applicable to the states. See id. at 436-39
(discussing Court’s rejection of “total incorporation”).
20. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939); see also McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 n.1 (1995) (“The term ‘liberty’ in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution makes the First Amendment applicable to the States.”); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (stating the Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment applicable to
the states); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The fundamental concept of liberty
embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment.”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (“The freedom of speech and of the
press, which are secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States, are among
the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth
Amendment against abridgment by a state.”); Lovell v. City of Griffen, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938)
(applying First Amendment in Georgia state case); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[A]ll fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by
the Federal Constitution from invasion by the States. The right of free speech, the right to teach and
the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights.”).
Interestingly, one of the amendments proposed with the original Bill of Rights was one written by
James Madison that protected freedom of speech, press, and religion from abridgment by state
governments. Though the House of Representatives approved this proposed amendment, the more
state-oriented Senate rejected it. See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 67-68 (1991).
As early as 1907 in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), Justice Harlan, in his dissenting
opinion, offered an early articulation of the application of the First Amendment through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The majority opinion, written by Justice Holmes, explicitly left undecided “the question
whether there is to be found in the Fourteenth Amendment a prohibition similar to that in the First.” Id.
at 462. Recognizing that freedom of speech and freedom of the press are rights belonging to citizens of
the United States at large, Harlan emphasized the explicit language of the Fourteenth Amendment
allowing no state to “make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.” Id. at 464 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1) (emphasis added).
In his articulation that the First Amendment guarantees apply to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, Harlan stated:
As the First Amendment guaranteed the rights of free speech and of a free press against hostile
action by the United States, it would seem clear that when the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited
the States from impairing or abridging the privileges of citizens of the United States it necessarily
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss2/11
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Further, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the First
Amendment’s prohibition against abridging speech extends to expressive
conduct, so long as that conduct is sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication.21 The Court developed a two-factor test to determine
whether conduct is expressive conduct. To be protected by the First
Amendment, the conduct must reflect an intent to convey a particularized
message and there must be a great likelihood that the message will be
understood.22 Applying this test, the Court has found various forms of
conduct to be forms of expression, such as: a sit-in;23 the hanging of a United
States flag upside-down;24 the burning of an American flag;25 a child’s
decision, on religious grounds, not to salute the American flag;26 and the
wearing of a black armband.27
prohibited the States from impairing or abridging the constitutional rights of such citizens to free
speech and a free press.
Id. at 464.
By 1925, however, the Supreme Court “assumed” that the First Amendment guarantees applied to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). A
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed freedom of speech was not necessary to determine
this case because the Court ultimately decided that the substantive due process argument had little, if
any, merit. See id. at 666-67. Justice Holmes’s dissenting opinion clearly indicates the persuasive force
of Justice Harlan’s argument in Patterson. Holmes’s dissent states that “[t]he general principle of free
speech . . . must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has
been given to the word ‘liberty’ as there used . . . .” Id. at 672.
While this principle appears to be a settled issue of constitutional law, Supreme Court Justice John
Paul Stevens recently spoke at the University of Chicago School of Law’s symposium entitled The Bill
of Rights in the Welfare State and criticized the incorporation doctrine. Stevens recognized that
“[r]espected scholars have, however, questioned the legitimacy of the Court’s doctrine incorporating
portions of the Bill of Rights into the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” John Paul
Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 13, 20 (1992). Stevens
recognized that by incorporating the command of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth, the
Supreme Court ignored the plain language of the First, which prohibited only Congress from making
laws. See id. at 24-25.
21. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“[W]e have acknowledged that
conduct may be ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.’” (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974))).
22. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404. Also, in Spence v. Washington, the Court stated that if the
actor has an “intent to convey a particularized message . . . and in the surrounding circumstances the
likelihood [is] great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it,” the First
Amendment protects the expression of that message. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
23. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (plurality opinion).
24. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 415 (holding that displaying flag with peace symbol on it outside an
apartment was a form of expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment).
25. See Johnson, 491 U.S at 406.
26. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
27. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (“[T]he
wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is
within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”).
The Supreme Court has even found nude dancing in a lounge and in an adult bookstore to be
expressive conduct. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991).
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B. Public Forum Doctrine
While the First Amendment appears to speak in absolutist terms,
“Congress28 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . .,”29
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the protection offered to speech
and expressive conduct by the First Amendment is not absolute.30 Speech is
not equally permissible at all times and in all places, especially when the
property where the speech occurs is owned by the state.31 To de ermine
The Court, however, has rejected the notion that its previous opinions demonstrate that “an
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the
conduct intends thereby to express an idea.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). For
example, the Court has refused to extend freedom of speech rights to physical assault. See Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (noting that a physical assault is not, “by any stretch
of the imagination,” expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment).
28. Additionally, through the extension of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause,
neither may states. S e supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
30. A recent law review article discussing the Texas Adopt-A-Highway case noted that “[w]hile
the freedom of speech is regarded as the central protection afforded by the Bill of Rights, it is by no
means absolute.” David Garland, Recent Development, Texas v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan: The
Fifth Circuit Applies the Public Forum Doctrine to Adopt-a-Highway Programs, 70 TUL. L. REV.
1195, 1196 (1996); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic.”).
While a majority of the Supreme Court has never adopted an absolutist view of free speech,
several notable justices on the Court have, at times, championed such a view. Arguing against a
balancing approach to First Amendment liberties, Justice Black stated that “the First Amendment’s
unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgement of the rights of free speech and assembly
shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the ‘balancing’ that was to be done in this
field.” Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 60 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting), reh’g denied, 368 U.S.
869 (1961).
31. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (“It is
undeniable, of course, that speech which is constitutionally protected against state suppression is not
thereby accorded a guaranteed forum on all property owned by the State.”); Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (noting that the First Amendment does not require
“equivalent access to all parts of a school building in which some form of communicative activity
occurs”); see also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 136 (1977) (prison
administrators permitted to regulate expression of prisoners); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 117-18 (1972) (no “absolute constitutional right to use all parts of a school building or its
immediate environs” for unlimited expressive purposes). Further, the Supreme Court has stated that
“[n]othing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to
exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without regard to the nature
of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker’s activities.” Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 799-800.
Interestingly, the First Amendment is the only Constitutional Amendments prohibiting
governmental action that is written in absolutist language. For example, the Fourth Amendment does
not guard against all searches and seizures; it merely protects individuals against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). Similarly, the Eighth Amendment
does not protect an individual from having to post bail; he is merely protected from paying
“[e]xcessive bail.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
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whether a court should protect speech or expressive conduct on goverment-
owned property, the Supreme Court adopted the public forum doctrine.32
Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court directs lower federal courts and state
courts to consider the type of forum where the speech occurs.33 Beginning
with Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,34 the Court has
recognized three different types of forums, granting each a different level of
First Amendment protection. These forums are (1) the traditional public
forum, (2) the limited or designated public forum, and (3) the nonpublic
forum.35
Different rules control the permissible governmental regulation of each
forum. Therefore, in First Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court directs
lower courts to first determine the type of forum in question.36 Whil  the
doctrine is not comprehensive, the Supreme Court has offered some guidance
in this task.
1. Traditional Public Forum
The Court has defined traditional public forums as “places which by long
tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.”37
32. For an early discussion of the public forum doctrine, see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of
the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 S. CT. REV. 1. Through a discussion of civil rights protest
cases, Kalven sought to constitutionally justify the exercise of speech rights by proposing that the
Court consider public property as a public forum. See id. at 11-12.
For an excellent discussion of the history of the public forum doctrine, see Marie A. Failinger,
New Wine, New Bottles: Private Property Metaphors and Public Forum Speech, 71 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 217, 237-54 (1997).
33. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (noting that “the extent to which the Government can control
access depends on the nature of the relevant forum”); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)
(holding that a state has power to “‘preserve property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated’” (quoting Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966))).
34. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
35. This forum analysis recognizes that “[w]here the government is acting as a proprietor,
managing its internal operations, rather than acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license,
its action will not be subjected to the heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be
subject.” International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992); see
also United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725-27 (1990); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961).
36. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797 (“[W]e must identify the nature of the forum, because the
extent to which the Government may limit access depends on whether the forum is public or
nonpublic.”); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)
(recognizing that “[t]he existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which
limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at
issue”).
37. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 800 (1985) (noting that a traditional public forum is property that has as a principle purpose the
free exchange of ideas).
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Examples offered by the Court are streets and public parks because they
“have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”38 Lower federal courts
have recognized public forums to exist in places such as town squares,39
public sidewalks,40 and state and federal capitol complexes.41
The Court is most likely to invalidate state or local regulation of speech in
a traditional public forum. When the government regulates speech in such a
forum, it may only base its restriction on the content of the speech being
regulated if: (1) the content falls within a category of speech that the
Supreme Court has found unprotected by the First Amendment;42 or (2) the
government can demonstrate a compelling interest in suppressing the
speech.43 In regulating public forums, the Supreme Court has held that a state
or Congress “may impose [only] reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions”44 o long as the restriction is “necessary, and narrowly
drawn, to serve a compelling state interest.”45
38. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1936) (Roberts, J., concurring); see
also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
39. See Missouri ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n v. Cuffley, 927 F. Supp. 1248,
1255 (E.D. Mo. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 112 F.3d 1332 (8th Cir. 1997).
40. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1255-56.
41. See ACT-UP v. Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281, 1287 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
42. For a discussion of the categories of speech not protected by the First Amendment, or granted
a lower level of protection, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS 239-332 (2d ed. 1996).
43. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995).
44. Id. Some Supreme Court justices have argued that because this so-called public property is
actually owned by the government, the government has the right to prohibit anyone from using it. For
example, while still a Massachusetts state court judge, Justice Holmes reasoned that “[f]or the
Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no
more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to
forbid it in his house.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895), aff’d sub nom., Davis
v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). In unanimously affirming Holmes, the Supreme Court noted
that “the right to absolutely exclude all right to use [public property], necessarily includes the authority
to determine under what circumstances such use may be availed of, as the greater power contains the
lesser.” Davis, 167 U.S. at 48.
45. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 761; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (“[S]peakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the
exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to
achieve that interest.”); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(The state “must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980))).
The state does not have the right to exclude someone simply because they do not agree with the
message that the person wishes to convey. “A state may not grant the use of a forum to groups who use
it to express popular views, but deny use to those wishing to express views not favored by the public
or those officials who presume to represent the public view.” KKK v. Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. 1427,
1436 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
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In 1989, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,46 the Court defined this
compelling interest test in a way that has been criticized as taking some of
the “bite” out of the test. The Court determined that a narrowly-tailored
requirement is one that promotes a substantial and legitimate government
interest that, without the regulation, would be achieved less effectively.47
Such a regulation may not burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to further the government’s interest.48
The government also must implement these restrictions without regard to
the content of the speech.49 The government does not have the power to grant
the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to
people whose views it does not like.50 The Supreme Court has noted that “the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”51 If this
rule were otherwise, a state would be able to hide infringements on speech
through governmental regulations of the forum used for the speech. Such an
infringement would frustrate the purpose of the public forum.
Further, the regulations cannot have the effect of prohibiting all types of
Rather than using this two-prong test, the Supreme Court will sometimes apply a more general
principle in determining whether a governmental regulation violates an individual’s or a group’s right
to free speech. In United States v. O’Brien, the Court stated that governmental regulation of speech or
expressive conduct in a public forum is permissible:
[I]f it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), reh’g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968).
46. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
47. See id. at 799. The dissent criticized the Court for seriously distorting the narrowly tailored
requirement. See id. at 804-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. See id. at 799. For example, a ban on handbilling would suppress speech that does not cause
the harms that the ban seeks to eliminate, such as fraud, crime, litter, traffic congestion, or noise.
Therefore, a complete ban on handbilling would be substantially broader than necessary to achieve the
interests justifying it. See SHIFFRIN & CHOPER, supra note 42, at 391 n.7.
49. For example, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), the Court
invalidated an ordinance that prohibited picketing near a school building but provided an exemption
for peaceful labor picketing. The Court reasoned that while the ordinance purported to regulate the
time, place, and manner of speech activities in the public forum, it did so based on the content of the
speech, which was impermissible. See id. at 102; see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)
(invalidating statute that prohibited all picketing of residences or dwellings except for peaceful
picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85 (1977) (invalidating ordinance that banned “for sale” and “sold” signs because it regulated
based on content of speech); Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (holding that governmental agencies at public meetings cannot
discriminate between speakers on the basis of their employment or the content of their speech).
50. See, e.g., KKK v. Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. 1427, 1436 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
51. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p557 note Stone.doc 07/27/99   11:06 AM
566 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:557
speech in the public forum because such a ban would totally suppress the
public’s ability to communicate messages in a public place. In United States
v. Grace,52 the Court directed that in implementing reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions, the government must “leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.”53
2. Limited or Designated Public Forum
In terms of limits on regulation, limited or designated public forums are
treated substantially similar to traditional public forums.54 Defined as “public
property which the state has opened for use by the public as a place for
expressive activity,”55 the Court looks for clear governmental intent to create
the limited forum. As such, the Court will not infer the government intent to
52. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
53. Id. at 177 (internal quotations omitted).
54. See International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)
(“Regulation of such property is subject to the same limitations as that governing a traditional public
forum.”). In Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983), the Court
noted that “[a]lthough a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as
long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.”
Some courts have argued, then, that it does not matter if a forum is labeled either a limited or a
traditional public forum. See Texas v. KKK, 853 F. Supp. 958, 960 n.3 (E.D. Tex. 1994); KKK v.
Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. 1427, 1434 (W.D. Ark. 1992). This argument lacks merit, however. Because a
state has the right to take away a limited public forum, just as easily as it has the right to create one,
limited public forums are inherently given less protection than traditional public forums. See Perry,
460 U.S. at 46. For example, if a court held that the program was a limited public forum in any of the
cases being discussed in this Note, the state could have simply disposed of the program as a means of
not allowing the Klan to participate in it. Indeed, Anne Arundel County, Maryland recently took this
approach in response to the Klan’s application to adopt a county highway. See Tom Pelton, Klan Bid
to Join Adopt-A-Road Leads to Closing; Arundel Executive Is Strongly Opposed; “What Good Does
This Do?”, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 6 1999, available at  1999 WL 5175063. If this program were a
limited public forum, that action would in no way violate the Constitution. But if a court determines
that the program is a traditional public forum, there is no way for the state to exclude the Klan absent a
finding of a compelling governmental purpose.
In Lee, Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion recognized the flaw in this argument as well. By
allowing the government to define, in effect, the terms and limits of a forum, the government is given
“almost unlimited authority to restrict speech on its property by doing nothing more than articulating a
non-speech-related purpose for the area.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 695. Under this clear intent approach, all a
state has to do to curb an individual’s free exercise of speech is to leave its intentions vague in the
statutory language. See id.
55. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. In Cornelius, the Court defined this type of forum as “a forum . . .
created by government designation of a place or channel of communication for use by the public at
large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects.”
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
Further, “[a] public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as for certain groups, or for
the discussion of certain subjects.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (internal citations omitted). For example,
the Court has recognized a limited public forum for student groups at a university in Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), and one for school board business in Madison Joint School District No.
8 v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
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create a limited public forum.56 The Court looks to the “policy and practice”
of the government in determining whether it intended to designate a
nontraditional forum as open to assembly and debate.57 The Court also
considers the nature of the property in question to determine whether it is
compatible with expressive activity.58 Some examples of forums that courts
have labeled as limited public forums are university meeting facilities,
municipal theaters, and school board meetings.59
Although the state voluntarily creates a limited public forum, there are
still many restrictions imposed upon the government in regulating the
language and expressive conduct in the forum.60 For example, in Widmar v.
Vincent, the Court held that once a state university opened its facilities for the
activities of registered student groups, it could not discriminate among those
groups on the basis of content and could not close its facilities to a student
group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and discussion.61
Although the Court recognizes that a state need not indefinitely keep a
limited public forum open to the public, while the forum is open, the Court
imposes the same restrictions on the state concerning restrictions on limited
public forums as it does on traditional public forums.62 Specifically, in a
limited public forum, a state may only impose reasonable, content-neutral
time, place, and manner restrictions so long as the restriction is necessary and
narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.63
56. “The government does not create a [limited] public forum by . . . permitting limited
discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.” Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. See id.; see also Widmar, 454 U.S. 263 (holding that a university that had expressly created a
place for student groups to meet had created a designated public forum).
59. See Missouri ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n v. Cuffley, 927 F. Supp. 1248,
1256 (E.D. Mo. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 112 F.3d 1332 (8th Cir. 1997).
60. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. “The Constitution forbids a state to enforce certain exclusions
from a forum generally open to the public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first
place.” Id. (emphasis added). “Even if the state was not required to create the forum, once it does, it
may not discriminate against groups because of the content of the speech which the group intends to
promote in that forum.” KKK v. Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. at 1436; see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267.
61. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
62. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). “Although a
state is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is
bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.” Id.; see also Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (noting that “when the Government has
intentionally designated a place or means of communication as a public forum speakers cannot be
excluded without a compelling governmental interest”).
63. See supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
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3. Nonpublic Forum
Every forum that is not a traditional or limited public forum is a
nonpublic forum. The Supreme Court defines a nonpublic forum by what it is
not. Any forum “which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication” is a nonpublic forum.64 Examples of nonpublic forums are
street light posts,65 prisons,66 military reservations,67 polling places,68
statutorially-required meetings of school administrators and a teachers
union,69 and a school district’s internal mail system.70
Recognizing that states need public property for purposes other than
public communication, the Court grants states much wider latitude in
controlling and limiting access to nonpublic forums than to traditional or
limited public forums.71 Indeed, the Court recognizes that the government
may operate property dedicated to the promotion of a specific governmental
purpose where public speech may not be appropriate.72 Reminiscent of the
words of Justice Holmes,73 the Court recognizes that “the State, no less than
a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”74 The state may impose
restrictions on time, place, and manner of speech and expression, and the
regulation on speech merely has to be reasonable,75 so long as it “is not an
64. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; see also Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1256 (recognizing further that
nonpublic forums consist of “property usually incompatible with expressive activity”).
65. See Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984).
66. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (upholding prison ban on letters between
nonrelative inmates); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (labeling prison grounds as nonpublic
forum).
67. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
68. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). In determining that a
polling place was a nonpublic forum, Justice Scalia focused on the term “traditional” in the definition
of a public forum. Id. at 214. Restrictions on speech around polling places have long been a part of the
American tradition of secret balloting. See id. at 214-15. The plurality, however, determined that the
100-foot zone around the polling place was a public forum. See id. at 196-98.
69. See Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984).
70. See Missouri ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n v. Cuffley, 927 F. Supp. 1248,
1256 (E.D. Mo. 1996); see also Perry, 460 U.S. 37.
71. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 805-06 (1985);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
72. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805-06.
73. See supra note 44.
74. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (citations
omitted).
75. See id. “In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the state may reserve the forum
for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker’s view.” Id.; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.
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effort to suppress the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the
speaker’s view.”76
II. ADOPT-A-HIGHWAY CASES
A. Generally
Traditionally, states have been responsible for transportation and road
maintenance, including litter control.77 Because the total cost of road
maintenance takes a large portion of state revenue, states have sought ways
to reduce this cost.78 Accordingly, some states, such as Missouri, Texas, and
Arkansas,79 have developed “Adopt-A-Highway” Programs in which
members of the public cleanup the litter along the sides of highways at their
own cost.80 Under such a program, a person, a group of persons, or an
76. International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) (citing
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46). In Perry, the Court stated that it would permit a state to regulate speech in
nonpublic forums so long as the regulation on speech “is not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” 460 U.S. at 46 (citing United States Postal Serv.
v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)).
77. In applying the “traditional government function” test from National League of Cities v.
Usery, the First Circuit found that transportation and highway programs are one of the “activities [that]
are typical of those performed by state and local governments in discharging their dual functions of
administering the public law and furnishing public services.” Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway
Auth., 680 F.2d 841, 844-45 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
851 (1976)). The First Circuit recognized that arranging for the building of roads, building roads,
operating toll roads, and keeping roads in repair are traditional and integral state governmental
activities. See id. at 845.
Most states have created an administrative agency to maintain the state highway systems. These
agencies are typically given full authority in the construction and maintenance of the highways. See,
e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 227.030 (1994) (“The construction and maintenance of said highway system
and all work incidental thereto shall be under the general supervision and control of the state highways
and transportation commission.”).
78.  See Missouri ex rel. Missouri Highway & Trans. Comm’n v. Cuffley, 927 F. Supp. 1248,
1251-52 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
79. Other states, such as Connecticut, CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 13a-97b-1 to -7 (1997), North
Carolina, N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19A, r. 2D.1001-.107 (June 1998), Oregon, OR. ADMIN. R. 734-029-
0005 to -0040 (1998), and Washington, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 468-72-010 to -050 (1997) have
similar programs. This Note, however, will focus only on programs in Missouri, Texas and Arkansas
because only these states have litigated applications to participate in the program.
80. “The purpose of the Adopt-A-Highway Program is to increase public awareness of the
environmental needs along Missouri’s highways and to provide volunteer community support for anti-
litter and highway beautification programs. This program will reduce litter along the highways,
enhance the environment and beautify Missouri’s roadsides.” MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 7, § 10-
14.010 (1995).
In describing the adoption of the program, the Eastern District of Missouri recognized that “[i]n
furtherance of its continuing maintenance of the state highway system, the [Missouri Highway and
Transportation] Commission has established an Adopt-A-Highway Program, which is a voluntary
Program enacted to promote litter control and to reduce the costs of litter abatement to the
Commission.” Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. 1248, 1251-52 (E.D. Mo. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 112
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organization81 “adopts” a portion of the highway, and in return for
maintaining its cleanliness, the state dedicates a sign on the side of the
highway recognizing the group’s work and commitment to the community.82
In Missouri, the Missouri State Highway Transportation Commission (the
“Commission”) adopted regulations to oversee this program.83 These
regulations provide that “civic and nonprofit organizations, commercial and
private enterprises and individuals” may join to clean or maintain a
designated portion of the highway.84 The Commission does not distinguish
between individual or group participation, non-profit or for-profit groups, or
secular or religious groups.85 The regulations grant the Commission “sole
responsibility” to accept or reject an application for participation86 based
upon any of several reasons.87 The Commission does not, however, have the
authority to reject a group’s application based upon disagreement with the
group’s views.88
The application process is substantially similar in Missouri, Texas, and
Arkansas. In Missouri’s program, a prospective applicant begins by
contacting the local highway department office and requesting the
availability of highway locations.89 The applicant then submits an application
for a location based upon the information provided at the highway
F.3d 1332 (8th Cir 1997).
81. “Eligible adopters include civic and nonprofit organizations, commercial and private
enterprises and individuals.” MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 7, § 10-14.030(1) (1995).
82. “[T]he participants receive recognition for their efforts through a sign provided by the
Commission acknowledging the identity of the group providing the work.” Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at
1252.
83. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 7, § 10, ch. 14 (1995). The Commission adopted these
regulations in response to the Klan’s application to participate in the program. See Cuffley v. Mickes,
No. 4:97CV2110-SNL, 1999 WL 216439, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 13, 1999). Prior to the adoption of
these regulations in February 1995, local highway department offices followed an informal “internal
letter” in administering the program. See Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1252. This letter provided no
procedures, restriction, or minimal qualifications for participation in the program. See id.
84. Id. § 10-14.030(1). Arkansas’s program is similar in this respect. “Businesses, individuals,
and other groups are permitted to adopt a section of the highway for the purpose of litter control.”
KKK v. Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. 1427, 1430 (W.D. Ark. 1992). The Texas program allows
participation in the program by “members or employees of civic and non-profit organizations, and of
commercial and private enterprises.” Texas v. KKK, 853 F. Supp. 958, 959 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
85. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 7 § 10-14.030(1) (1995).
86. Id. § 10-14.030(2).
87. The regulations give the Commission the right to deny an application for many reasons: if the
grant of the application would “jeopardize the program,” id. § 10-14030(2)(A), if it would “be
counterproductive to [the program’s] purpose,” id., if it would “have undesirable results such as
increased litter, vandalism or sign theft,” id., if the applicant “discriminate[s] on the basis of race,
religion, color, national origin or disability,” id. § 10-14030(2)(B), or, if the applicant has a “history of
unlawfully violent or criminal behavior.” Id. § 10-14030(2)(C).
88. See id. § 10-14030(2).
89. See Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1252.
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department office.90 The local office forwards the completed application
form to the main Commission office.91 Th  Commission approves the
overwhelming majority of the applications without any review. Applications
that the Commission does review are considered on a case-by-case basis.92
When the Commission sets aside an application for review, it labels the
application “sensitive.”93 The Commission can deny an application for such
broad, vague reasons as “the request would jeopardize the program,” or it
would be “counterproductive to its purpose”; therefore, the Commission
exercises broad discretion in deciding which applicants receive this status.94
B. Adopt-A-Highway Programs as a Form of Expressive Conduct
In May 1994, Michael Cuffley, as a representative of the Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan, applied to adopt a portion of an interstate highway in St.
Louis, Missouri.95 Following the procedures outlined above, Cuffley sought
to adopt a portion of Interstate 5596 by completing the application.97 The
Commission voted in a special meeting to “refer the matter for litigation as a
means of securing the Commission’s right to deny the Klan’s participation in
the Program.”98 The Commission sued the Klan for declaratory judgment for
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 7, § 10-14.030(2)(A) (1995). Examples of groups that have
received “special review treatment” are a gay and lesbian awareness group, the Environmental
Witches, and Truckin’ Seduction. All of these groups ultimately received approval, although Truckin’
Seduction was asked to change its name. Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1252. Similarly, the Texas
Commission approved applications from groups such as pit bull owners, nudists, prison inmates, a
smokers rights organization and a gay and lesbian rights group. See David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics,
and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1030, 1052 (1995).
93. Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1252.
94. See id. Addressing the case for the first time, the district court noted that “[t]he measure of
acceptability of a group is solely within the discretion of the Commission officials.” Id.
95. See id.
96. See id. “The section of the highway that is on the application received by the Commission
from the Klan is one of the routes used by busses transporting African-American students from St.
Louis City to and from county schools as part of the desegregation efforts.” Id. at 1253. Similarly, the
Klan’s application in Texas was for a stretch of highway near a federally subsidized housing complex,
which had recently been desegregated. See Texas v. KKK, 853 F. Supp. 958, 959 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
97. See Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1252.
98. Id. at 1253. In December, 1991, the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department
received an application similar to Cuffley’s from Nathan Robb, acting on behalf of the Klan. See KKK
v. Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. 1427, 1431 (W.D. Ark. 1992). In a memorandum dated December 9, 1991,
the department’s chief counsel recommended that the department deny the Klan’s application, which
the department soon did. See id. This was the first and only denial of an application to participate in
the Adopt-A-Highway Program made by the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Program.
See id. at 1431-32.
In December, 1993, Michael D. Lowe and James R. Hall, Jr., acting on behalf of the Ku Klux
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the right to deny the application. While the Eastern District of Missouri
concluded that the Commission did not have the right to deny the Klan’s
application, the Eighth Circuit reversed that decision. The Eighth Circuit
determined that because the Commission had not yet acted upon the Klan’s
application, the issue of the Commission’s right to deny the application was
not ripe for judicial review. The court dismissed the state’s declaratory
judgment action.99
Following dismissal of the case, the Commission denied the Klan’s
application, stating that the Klan violated discrimination laws and had a
history of violent lawlessness.100 The Klan responded by filing suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,101 claiming that the Commission deprived it of equal
protection and freedom of speech, and seeking to enjoin the Commission
from denying its application.102
The Adopt-A-Highway Programs of Missouri, Texas, and Arkansas are
forms of expressive conduct, and, therefore, fall under the protections of the
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.103 At l ast in part, participants in the
programs intend to and actually do convey a message to the traveling
public.104 By picking up litter and maintaining a litter-free portion of the
highway, the participants convey that they are environmentally conscious
and politically and socially correct.105 The Commission presumes that most
applicants have good intentions and thus approves most applications as a
matter of form.106 The Commission, however, did not afford this
presumption to the Klan, as demonstrated by the Commission’s act of setting
Klan, applied to join the Texas Adopt-A-Highway Program. See Texas v. KKK, 853 F. Supp. at 959.
Similar to the Missouri Commission, the Texas Department took no action on the application, rather, it
sued the Klan for declaratory judgment. See id.
99. See Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp at 1253; Missouri v. Cuffley, 112 F.3d 1332, 1337-38 (8th Cir.
1997).
100. See Cuffley v. Mickes, No. 4:97CV2110-SNL, 1999 WL 216439, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 13,
1999). The Commission also denied the application based on a moratorium on adoptions within the
City of St. Louis, enacted by the Commission during the pendency of the first litigation. See id.
101. See id. The court was outraged by the Klan’s use of this civil rights statute which Congress
originally enacted as Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan act of April 20, 1870, designed to end the Klan’s
practice of systematically depriving African-Americans of their rights in the Reconstruction South. See
id. at *6. The court noted that it could not “escape the bitter irony in the fact that the Klan should now
seek shelter for those same views of hatred and superiority under the very statute that Congress passed
to end the Klan’s unsavory influence.” Id.
102. See id. at *2.
103. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
104. This discussion temporarily ignores the Klan, or any other potentially offensive group, as a
possible participant in the program.
105. See KKK v. Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. at 1435-36. The states also recognize that participants in
the programs are also motivated by the “desire for publicity or ‘free advertising,’ . . . recognition of
their views, . . . the desire to proselytize for new members.” Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1252.
106. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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aside the Klan’s application to receive special treatment.
Courts that have addressed the issue tend to agree with the presumption of
such commissions and recognize that the message intended by the Klan is not
always as altruistic as environmental friendliness. The Eastern District of
Texas concluded that the message intended by the Klan through participation
in Texas’s Program was the intimidation of minority residents of a
desegregated federal housing complex.107 While the general public may not
agree with the message, it is a message nonetheless.108 A mes age of
intimidation does not, however, detract from the fact that the Klan can be just
as environmentally friendly and generous with its time as other groups.109
Both the message that the court concluded was intended by the Klan, and
the message that the Adopt-A-Highway Program presumes that its
participants will send to the public, meet the two-prong test necessary for
conduct to fall into the special category of expressive conduct that is
protected by the First Amendment.110 Simply by participating in the program,
the Klan and other participants have demonstrated their intent to convey a
message, whether that message be environmental friendliness or
intimidation.111 Further, a great likelihood exists that the intended message
will be understood by passersbys seeing the sign on the side of the
highway.112
107. See Texas v. KKK, 853 F. Supp. at 959 (5th Cir 1995). Similarly, the message intended by
Cuffley’s application to Missouri’s program cannot be determined without, at the very least, a
recognition that the Klan chose a portion of highway traveled daily by young African-Americans
bused out of the city for desegregation. See Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1253.
108. There is a strong argument that the message is a form of “hate speech,” which the Court has
stated, at times, does not receive the same level of protection as other types of speech. It is unclear
what level of protection hate speech should receive. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Note. This Note assumes that the stages of public forum
analysis addressed here would not change if a court determined that the speech at issue in Texas v.
KKK should receive some lesser form of First Amendment protection.
109. See Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1254-55 (recognizing that “the message intended to be
conveyed by the participants is that they are environmentally-conscious and altruistic contributors to
their community”).
110. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
111. The intent element is proved whether the intent is to convey a message of intimidation or a
message of environmental friendliness.
112. For example, if the Texas court correctly determined the message intended by the Klan to be
intimidation of residents of a recently desegregated housing complex, then a sign clearly stating
“Adopted by the Ku Klux Klan” seen by minority residents previously harassed by the Klan members
the message of intimidation would be understood.
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III. PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT OF ADOPT-A-HIGHWAY
PROGRAMS
Federal courts have taken five approaches to the issue of which type of
forum a state’s Adopt-A-Highway Program entails. These decisions are
inconsistent both in rationale and result.113The Western District of Arkansas
concluded that Arkansas’s program was a traditional public forum.114 On
appeal from the Eastern District of Texas, the Fifth Circuit decided that
Texas’s program was a nonpublic forum.115 Addressing Missouri’s program
prior to the adoption of formal regulations, the Eastern District of Missouri
concluded that the program was a limited public forum.116 When confronted
with these formal regulations, however, a different judge in the Eastern
District of Missouri concluded that the Commission intended to create a
nonpublic forum.117 In making these decisions, the courts cited the same
Supreme Court cases, yet, for remarkably similar programs, they reached
different results.118
In deciding that the program was a traditional public forum, the Arkansas
court looked to the highways themselves as the relevant forum.119 According
to the court, because highways are traditional public forums,120 the program
must also be a traditional public forum because it utilizes these highways as
the place for the expressive conduct.121
113. See Texas v. KKK, 58 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995); Cuffley v. Mickes, No. 4:97CV2110-SNL,
1999 WL 216439 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 13, 1999); Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. 1248; Texas v. KKK, 853 F. Supp.
958 (E.D. Tex. 1994); KKK v. Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. 1427 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
114. See KKK v. Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. at 1435.
115. See Texas v. KKK, 58 F.3d at 1078. The Eastern District of Texas stated that highway rights-
of-way used in the Adopt-A-Highway Program were either traditional public forums or designated
public forums but chose not to determine with certainty the specific type being used. Texas v. KKK,
853 F. Supp. at 959 n.3.
116. See Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1257.
117. See Cuffley II, 1999 WL 216439, at *3.
118. See supra notes 77-94 and accompanying text.
119. See KKK v. Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. at 1435.
120. “It is undeniable that public roads . . . are used for public speech and for the promotion of
various political, religious, social and commercial views. . . . [P]ublic highway rights-of-way have
become places where ‘speech’ of one type or another is engaged in.” Id.
121. See id. The court also recognized that even if they determined that the program was a limited
public forum, the result would be the same because the same constitutional rules controlling state
action against expressive conduct apply for traditional public forums and limited public forums. See id.
at 1434. “[E]ven if public highways are non-traditional places for public speech, the State of Arkansas
had created a public forum on public highways in Arkansas through the Adopt-A-Highway Program.”
Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1256 n.6.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Texas stated “[I]t [is not] necessary . . . to determine
with certainty the specific type of public forum being used; both are bound by the same standard.”
Texas v. KKK, 853 F. Supp. at 959 n.3.
The assumption by these courts that it does not matter if a forum is a traditional public forum or a
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Addressing Missouri’s program without the formal regulations, the
Eastern District of Missouri determined that the program was a limited public
forum.122 The court looked to the highway right-of-way as the relevant
forum.123 The court, however, concluded that the Commission’s creation of
the program constituted a decision to open the highways to expressive
conduct.124 Because the program inherently limited the speech to the
participants and also limited the speech that those participants could have,125
it could not be a traditional public forum.
Focusing on the formal regulations governing Missouri’s program, three
years later, the Eastern District of Missouri concluded that the program was a
nonpublic forum.126 Disagreeing with its earlier decision, the court concluded
that the program itself, rather than the highway right-of-way, was the
relevant forum to consider.127 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit decided that the
Texas program was a nonpublic forum,128 also holding that the program itself
was the forum, not the highway.129
IV. PROPOSAL: THE PROPER FORUM TO CONSIDER
The decisions of these courts demonstrate that public forum analysis can
depend upon a court’s determination of the forum in question.130 Mor
limited public forum is problematic because the creation and dissolution of traditional public forums
and limited public forums are not governed by the same standard. See supra notes 37-63 and
accompanying text.
122. See Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1257.
123. See id. at 1258. “[T]he access sought by the Klan in this case is not the program itself.
Instead, the Klan seeks access to the highway right-of-way where it can convey its message.” Id.
124. See id. at 1257.
125. See id. at 1257-58. The Commission limited the speech that the program allowed to “the
picking up of litter and the attendant expression that the participants are environmentally-conscious
and altruistic contributors to the community.” Id. at 1257-58.
126. See Cuffley v. Mickes, No. 4:97CV2110-SNL, 1999 WL 216439, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 13,
1999).
127. See id. at *4. In so holding, the court considered the Commission’s “tight control over the
program,” especially its control in choosing participants. Id.
128. See Texas v. KKK, 58 F.3d at 1078.
129. See id. at 1078.
[W]e define the forum in this case as the Program rather than the public highways. The Klan does
not seek general access to the public highways for speech purposes or even for litter retrieval
purposes. Rather, by participation in the Program, the Klan wishes the put its members on the
highway under the auspices of the State and get its name on a sign at a particular location.
Id.
130. For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992), depended upon the nature of the forum. In this case, a
not-for-profit religious organization brought suit against the police superintendent of the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey for the right to go “into public places, disseminat[e] religious
literature and solicit[] funds to support the religion.” Id. at 674-75. The Port Authority had adopted a
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importantly, these decisions demonstrate that judges can use the forum
determination to get the result they desire. Because the Supreme Court’s
doctrine gives states substantial leeway in controlling speech on nonpublic
forums, once a court determines that a forum is nonpublic, it will likely
determine that the governmental regulation is reasonable.131 Moreover, the
more narrowly a court defines the forum in question, the easier it is for the
court to find that it is a nonpublic forum.132 Conversly, once a court
determines that the forum is public, it will usually determine that the
government does not have a compelling interest in regulating the conduct133
because of the restrictions that the Supreme Court has imposed on the
government.134 Strong judicial discretion in the determination of the forum
regulation forbidding the “repetitive solicitation of money or distribution of literature” in airport
terminals but not on the sidewalks outside the airport terminals. Id. at 675. Similar to Cuffley’s claim
against the Commission in Cuffley II, the religious organization brought suit seeking “declaratory and
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the regulation worked to deprive its members of
rights guaranteed under the First Amendment.” Id. at 676.
The Southern District of New York analyzed the claim under the traditional public forum
approach and found that the state did not have compelling interests in prohibiting this activity and
granted summary judgment for the organization. See id. at 676-77. The Second Circuit and the
Supreme Court, however, both analyzed this case as a nonpublic forum. See id. at 677, 679. Because it
only requires a showing of reasonableness to uphold a regulation in a traditional public forum, the
Court determined that the regulation was within the state’s authority. See id. at 683.
131. The obvious exception to this statement is the Eastern District of Missouri’s decision in
Cuffley II. Although the court found that Missouri’s Adopt-A-Highway program was a nonpublic
forum, the court enjoined the Commission from denying the Klan’s application to participate in the
program in all areas of Missouri, except the City of St. Louis. See Cuffley v. Mickes, No.
4:97CV2110-SNL, 1999 WL 216439, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 13, 1999). That decision, however, was
based in part on the lack of specificity in the regulation prohibiting participation in the program by
“[a]pplicants with a history of unlawfully violent or criminal behavior.” Id. at *5. Had the Commission
explained what criminal behavior would prevent participation, and the reasons preventing such
participation, it is likely that the court would have upheld the exclusion of the Klan. See id.
132. For example, the Western District of Arkansas defined the forum in question as the highway
itself. Because streets are quintessential traditional public forums, see Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983), once the forum was defined as the highway, the
Arkansas court had no choice but to determine that it was a traditional public forum. See KKK v.
Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. 1427, 1434 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, defined the forum much more narrowly. That court defined it
as the Adopt-A-Highway program. See Texas v. KKK, 58 F.3d 1075, 1078 (5th Cir. 1995). Because
the program did not intend to provide a forum for public discourse as its central purpose, it was not a
traditional public forum. See id. Further, because the court focused on the one sign granted to program
participants as the forum for speech, the court had a simpler task to argue that the state did not intend
that sign to become a place of public discussion. Thus, the court also found that the state did not create
a designated public forum. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit determined that the forum, the Adopt-A-
Highway program and attendant sign, was a nonpublic forum. See Texas v. KKK, 58 F.3d at 1079.
133. The Adopt-A-Highway decision by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
853 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Tex. 1994), is an exception to this rule. Barring this case from the analysis,
states are usually not found to have a compelling interest in regulating conduct within the bounds of a
public forum. See supra Part I.B.1.
134. “[R]egulation of speech on government property that has traditionally been available for
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when applying the public forum doctrine is simply not a sufficiently
objective standard.135
Because the public forum analysis occurs at the stage at which the court
determines which forum is at issue, courts need guidance in correctly
determining the type of forum.136 A court should utilize a balancing approach
when determining the relevant forum for public forum analysis. Therefore, in
determining the relevant forum for public forum analysis, courts should
consider three factors: (1) the state’s intent in creating the program; (2) the
access sought by the particular party in the suit; and, (3) generally speaking,
the access sought by other participants in the program.
Currently, in determining the relevant forum for purposes of analysis,
lower courts only look to the second factor.137 For example, in Missouri ex
public expression is subject to the highest scrutiny.” See Lee, 505 U.S. at 678.
135. In his dissent in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., Justice Kennedy
articulated an objective test for applying the public forum doctrine which moved away from the
tripartite approach the Court first accepted in Perry. In rejecting the principles of traditional use and
government intent, Justice Kennedy stated:
The most important considerations in this analysis are whether the property shares physical
similarities with more traditional public forums, whether the government has permitted or
acquiesced in broad public access to the property, and whether expressive activity would tend to
interfere in a significant way with the uses to which the government has as a factual matter
dedicated the property.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 698-99. Kennedy’s approach implies a three-part inquiry: (1) a comparison of
physical characteristics between the property at issue and archetypical public forums; (2) the extent to
which the property has been opened to public use; (3) the extent to which unconstrained free speech
would interfere with the objective uses of the property. For an excellent discussion of Justice
Kennedy’s proposed inquiry, see Edward J. Neveril, “Objective” Approaches to the Public Forum
Doctrine: The First Amendment at the Mercy of Architectural Chicanery, 90 NW. U. L. Rev. 1185,
1217-53 (1996).
136. At least one author has identified a three-step inquiry for determining whether free speech
rights have been violated. First, courts should determine whether the participation or conduct is an
engagement in speech protected by the First Amendment. See Joe Sellars, Note, Can Courts Refrain
from Bias? The Fifth Circuit’s Decision in Texas ex. rel. Texas Transportation Commission v. Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1619, 1625 (1997). Second, courts should identify the nature
of the forum. See id. at 1626. Third, courts should “assess whether the justifications for exclusion from
the relevant forum satisfy the requisite standard.” Id. at 1628 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985)).
As demonstrated above, the second step tends to be dispositive. With no restrictions on identifying
the forum, courts have free reign to select a forum, and, therefore, also have free reign to determine if
someone’s conduct is protected from the governmental regulation at issue under the First Amendment.
Sellars suggests that if courts were instructed to apply a broad test of public forum as opposed to a
narrow test, they would analyze the problem correctly. See Sellars, supra at 1629-31, 1646-47. This
approach, however, simplifies the problem too much and looks too closely at the effect of the
regulation rather than the determination of the forum.
137. To illustrate, in discussing its decision that the program was a nonpublic forum, the Fifth
Circuit stated that the inquiry “[i]n pinpointing the relevant forum . . . must focus on the ‘access sought
by the speaker.’” KKK v. Texas, 58 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
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rel. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission v. Cuffley, the Eastern
District of Missouri began to articulate a test for the determination of the
proper forum.138 This court, however, suggested that the forum should be
defined by the access the party seeks.139This factor is not sufficient in and of
itself, however, because the Fifth Circuit applied the same test140 in Texas v.
KKK and defined the forum more narrowly than did the Missouri district
court.141 A workable test should have similar results in similar cases. These
contrasting decisions demonstrate that this factor is not sufficient because it
leaves too much latitude for a court to read its prejudices into the decision.
Another consideration should be whether the state, in creating the
program, intended it to be open for public discourse.142 For example, in
examining the Adopt-A-Highway Program, the relevant question for a court
would be whether the state intended, in creating the program, to open the
highways for public discourse or to limit the discourse to the sign and the
litter-collecting activity of the party.143
The court should also consider the conduct actually undertaken by people
in the program; that is, the court should consider the way in which the
program plays out in practice. For example, whether a forum has become a
place of public discourse should be of concern to the court, independent of
whether the state intended it for that purpose.144 By c nsidering the program
138. See Missouri ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n v. Cuffley, 927 F. Supp. 1248,
1258 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
139. See id. The Eastern District of Missouri determined:
The Klan does not seek general access to the public highways for speech purposes or even for
litter retrieval purposes. Rather, by participation in the Program, the Klan wishes to put its
members on the highway under the auspices of the State and get its name on a sign at a particular
location.
Id. at 1257 (citing Texas v. KKK, 58 F.3d 1075, 1078 (5th Cir 1995)).
In Cornelius, the Supreme Court referred to the access sought by the speaker as “the particular
channel of communication.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.
140. In fact, both courts cited the same language from the same Supreme Court opinions. For
example, the Fifth Circuit recognized that a “tailored approach” should be taken in determining the
proper forum. Texas v. KKK, 58 F.3d at 1078 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (1985)). The Eastern
District of Missouri extensively quoted the Fifth Circuit opinion, including the “tailored approach”
language. See Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1256-57.
141. That is, the Fifth Circuit determined the forum at issue narrowly to be the Adopt-A-Highway
program, while the Missouri District Court in Cuffley I determined the forum more broadly to be the
highway right-of-way. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
142. This consideration, of course, does not pertain to traditional public forums because they exist
independent of a state’s determination. Traditional public forums exist because they have always
existed, not because the state created them. As such, the state’s intentions are irrelevant.
143. This consideration also has problems because state-created programs do not always remain
the way that they are originally created. This problem can be remedied by considering the intention of
the state in maintaining the program if the program has changed since its creation.
144. Had this factor been utilized by the Fifth Circuit, the decision in Texas v. KKK, 58 F.3d 1075
(5th Cir. 1995), might have been different. The court there merely considered the state’s intentions in
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from this broader perspective, the court’s ability to read its political bias into
the decision is somewhat curtailed. It is more important that the program be
considered from the abstract view of any participant, rather than the
particular participant that is party to the suit.145
In balancing these factors, the court should place greater weight on the
state’s intentions and the general use of the program than it does the access
sought by the party to the suit. A court cannot, however, ignore that factor
because it removes the court’s analysis from an abstract “vacuum” and places
the analysis in a concrete, actual context, with real facts and real people to
consider.146
V. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED STANDARD
The three-factor balancing test proposed by this Note works in the context
of both Adopt-A-Highway and non-Adopt-A-Highway public forum cases.
As will be demonstrated by the analysis of the non-Adopt-A-Highway case,
the use of this test will sometimes result in the same forum chosen by the
court. Nevertheless, as will be shown in the Adopt-A-Highway context, the
test will sometimes result in the choice of a completely different forum.
A. Application of the Proposed Standard to the Adopt-A-Highway Case
If this balancing test were applied to the facts of the Adopt-A-Highway
cases discussed in this Note, the results would be more consistent. In creating
the development of the program and the Klan’s intention in applying to the program. The court did not
undertake a discussion of how others involved in the program see their participation in the program.
145. The majority of the population would generally agree that the Klan is not a sympathetic party
in a lawsuit on free speech grounds. Judges, like most people, have preconceived ideas about a group’s
purposes or intentions. It is as difficult for a judge, as any person, to separate his views of a party
independent of the legal question at issue. Judicial interpretation of law based on the unappealing
nature of the plaintiff, however, lacks legitimate legal foundation and threatens future constitutional
interpretation. See Deborah A. Widiss, Note, Re-Viewing History: The Use of the Past as Negative
Precedent in United States v. Virginia, 108 YALE L.J. 237, 249 (1998) (stating that a judge may not
give “free rein to his own emotions”).
For example, did the Fifth Circuit decide that Texas’s program was a nonpublic forum
independent of its disgust of the Klan’s previous actions? Probably. The decision was also based, in
large part, upon the Klan’s prior harassment of the local housing project. See Texas v. KKK, 58 F.3d at
1078 & n.1. In its holding, the court stated that “the State will not violate the First Amendment by
rejecting the Klan’s application to adopt a portion of highway near the housing project in Vidor,
Texas.” Id. The court also recognized that “the Klan’s conduct would serve only to threaten and
intimidate current and potential future residents of the Vidor project.” Id. at 1078 n.1.
146. By keeping the access sought by the party to the suit as a factor to be considered by the court,
the particular facts in cases such as Texas v. KKK would be taken into consideration. For example, in
Texas, the district court could determine that the Klan sought access to intimidate minority residents of
a housing complex; they did not seek access to a forum for public discourse.
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the programs, the states did not intend to create an open forum for speech
along the states’ highways. Rather, as the administrative codes of Missouri
and Texas exemplify, the states created the programs for one purpose: to
control litter along highways.147 The states, however, impliedly recognized
that the participants may use the programs as limited forums for speech by
offering participants a sign identifying their efforts on their “adopted” portion
of highway.148
Participants in the program, however, use the sign as a forum for speech
and propaganda, and the states are aware of this use.149 The tat s recognize
that some of the participants are motivated by the desire for free publicity and
advertising,150 and, for most groups, the Commission administering the
program does not object to participation in the program and use of the
recognition signs for this purpose.151
In the principle cases discussed in this Note, the Klan sought to
participate in the program for the same reasons as most other participants—
they sought either to use the sign for free publicity or to communicate a
viewpoint.152
Of paramount importance is the fact that the states did not intend to create
an open forum for speech along its highways.153 The states’ tacit acceptance
147. The Texas Administrative Code describes the purpose of the program as:
The Adopt-A-Highway Program . . . allows private citizens an opportunity to support the
department’s antilitter programs by adopting a section of highway for the purpose of controlling
and reducing litter on an adopted section.
43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 2.63(a) (West 1998) (emphasis added). Missouri Code of State Regulations
articulates a similar purpose:
(1) The purpose of the Adopt-A-Highway Program is to increase public awareness of the
environmental needs along Missouri’s highways and to provide volunteer community support for
anti-litter and highway beautification programs.
(2) This program will reduce litter along the highways, enhance the environment and beautify
Missouri’s roadsides.
MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 7, § 10-14.010 (1995) (emphasis added).
148. See, e.g., MO. CODE. REGS. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 10-14.040(3)(B), 10-14.050(1)(A), (C) (1995).
149. See, e.g., Cuffley I, 927 F. Supp. at 1252.
150. In Cuffley I the Missouri Commission recognized:
[M]any of the groups participating in the Program are motivated to participate in the Program by
the desire for publicity or “free advertising,” in the case of commercial organizations; recognition
of their views in the case of political or social organizations; and even the desire to proselytize for
new members, in the case of religious organizations.
Id. at 1252.
151. See id. “The Commission has no objection to these mixed motives.” Id.
152. For example, the court found the Klan in Texas sought participation in the program as a
means of communicating its intimidation of the residents of the recently-desegregated Vidor housing
project. Texas v. KKK, 58 F.3d at 1077. While this is not a sympathetic view, it is, nonetheless,
communication of an expression.
153. See id. at 1078. The Fifth Circuit explained that “[a]ny opportunity for speech provided by
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of the use of the signs as a form of free publicity, however, combined with
the participants’ use of the program for that purpose, demonstrate that the
programs themselves and the signs are public forums designated by the
states. Therefore, they should receive the First Amendment protection
appropriate for a limited public forum.154
B. Application of the Proposed Standard to a Non-Adopt-A-Highway First
Amendment Case
The balancing test for public forum analysis that this Note proposes155 can
also be used effectively in the context of non-Adopt-A-Highway expressive
conduct cases. For example, suppose a state owns a public plaza near the
statehouse in the capital city.156 The state’s administrative code makes this
plaza available for “use by the public . . . for free discussion of public
questions, or for activities of a broad public purpose.”157 The state has
established a simple application procedure for a group to follow to use the
plaza.158 While the state does not permit every applicant to use the plaza, the
reasons given for excluding groups focus primarily upon safety and
sanitation concerns.159 The state’s administrative code is neutral as to the
content of the proposed speech.160 Since this plaza was established over a
century ago, the state has allowed “a broad range of speakers and other
gatherings of people to conduct events.”161
The current litigation involves a local group seeking to place a religious
symbol that is potentially offensive to some community members in the
plaza for a three-week period.162 The state has already given permission for
the Program is peripheral” to the central purpose of the program. Id.
154. This program cannot be a traditional public forum because the program is too new to be
traditionally a place where ideas are exchanged. See supra notes 130-46 and accompanying text. It is,
therefore, a limited or designated public forum.
155. See supra notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
156. This hypothetical will loosely follow the facts from Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd.
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). For the Supreme Court’s articulation of the facts in Capitol Square,
see id. at 757-59.
157. Id. at 757 (quoting OHIO ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 128-4-02(A) (1994)).
158. See id. at 757-58.
159. See id. at 757-58.
160. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 128-4-02(A) (1997).
161. See Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 758 (internal citations omitted). In Capitol Square, the Ku
Klux Klan applied to Ohio’s Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board for permission to place a
cross in the plaza during the Christmas season. See id. The state agency denied the application. See id.
On appeal from the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court determined that the public plaza was a traditional
public forum and granted the Ku Klux Klan an injunction, requiring the state to permit the Ku Klux
Klan to display the cross. See id. at 770.
162. See id. at 758.
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other groups to place two other religious symbols in the plaza for the same
time period.163
The first factor of the balancing test requires that the court consider the
state’s intent in creating the plaza.164 To determine the appropriate forum for
the public forum analysis, the court applying this test must consider whether
the state intended to open the plaza entirely, or merely some small portion of
it to public debate. In this hypothetical, the state, for over a century, has made
the plaza available for “use by the public . . . for free discussion of public
questions.”165 Therefore, the state’s intent in creating this plaza and the
state’s continuous use of the plaza as a place of public debate for over a
century points to the plaza being the forum at issue.
The second factor is the access sought by the particular party in the
suit.166 In this case, the group is not seeking access to the entire plaza.
Because there are already two displays in the plaza, the group is only seeking
a small portion of the plaza. Most individuals and groups seeking access to
the plaza, however, seek access to the entire plaza, not merely a small portion
of it.167 Further, they do not seek to use the plaza concurrently with another
group’s discussion or display.
In balancing these factors, it is clear that although the group in question is
seeking to only use part of the plaza, the proper forum for the court to
consider in its analysis is the entire plaza. The two factors of greatest
importance, the state’s intent and the general use of the plaza,168 weigh in
favor of this approach.
CONCLUSION
While the United States Constitution guarantees an individual’s exercise
of his right to speak freely, that right is not absolute. When property is owned
by a state, the Supreme Court permits some regulation by the state
government. The public forum doctrine is the means by which a state or
federal court can determine whether a state has lawfully regulated expressive
conduct on state-owned property. The Court has effectively detailed the
limits on a state’s regulation of speech activity on each of the three types of
forums. The Court, however, has failed to instruct lower courts in the proper
means of determining the applicable location for this forum analysis.
163. See id.
164. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
165. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 128-4-02 (1997).
166. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
168. See supra text accompanying note 146.
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This Note offers a balancing test that, if adopted by the Court, would fill
the missing gap from this doctrine. To determine the proper location on
which to focus in the forum analysis, a court should balance three factors: (1)
the state’s intent in creating the program; (2) the access sought by the
particular party in the suit; and (3) generally speaking, the access sought by
other participants in the program. By utilizing this approach, a judge is less
likely to allow personal bias about a particular individual or group to cloud
the First Amendment analysis.
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